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Public accountability has re-emerged as a top priority for health systems all over
the world, and particularly in developing countries where governments have
often failed to provide adequate public sector services for their citizens. One
approach to strengthening public accountability is through direct involvement of
clients, users or the general public in health delivery, here termed ‘community
accountability’. The potential benefits of community accountability, both as an
end in itself and as a means of improving health services, have led to significant
resources being invested by governments and non-governmental organizations.
Data are now needed on the implementation and impact of these initiatives on
the ground. A search of PubMed using a systematic approach, supplemented by a
hand search of key websites, identified 21 papers from low- or middle-income
countries describing at least one measure to enhance community accountability
that was linked with peripheral facilities. Mechanisms covered included
committees and groups (n¼ 19), public report cards (n¼ 1) and patients’ rights
charters (n¼ 1). In this paper we summarize the data presented in these papers,
including impact, and factors influencing impact, and conclude by commenting
on the methods used, and the issues they raise. We highlight that the
international interest in community accountability mechanisms linked to
peripheral facilities has not been matched by empirical data, and present a
conceptual framework and a set of ideas that might contribute to future studies.
Keywords Community accountability, community participation, responsiveness, health
facilities, empirical studies, developing countries, committees, groups
KEY MESSAGES
 The majority of empirical papers we identified on community engagement at peripheral health facilities in low- or
middle-income countries focused primarily on health facility committees and groups.
 Key influences on the impact of the community engagement activities are: how committee and group members are
selected and their motivation for involvement; the relationship between groups or committees, health workers and health
managers; and provision of adequate resources and support by local and national governments.
 International interest in community accountability mechanisms linked to peripheral facilities has not been matched by
empirical data. We present a conceptual framework and a set of ideas for consideration in future studies.
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Introduction
Public accountability has re-emerged as a top priority for
health systems all over the world. Public accountability refers to
‘the spectrum of approaches, mechanisms and practices
used by the stakeholders concerned with public services
to ensure a desired level and type of performance’ (Paul
1991). Although there is a range of possible definitions of
accountability, the essence is of answerability between sets
of actors in relation to specific activities or interventions.
Answerability can be enforced with either positive or negative
sanctions, or internalized ethics such as codes of conduct
(Standing 2004).
Direct engagement of the public, citizens or communities in
accountability systems can be through ‘exit’ or ‘voice’ strategies
(Paul 1991). Exit strategies relate to citizen ability to access
alternative suppliers of a given service; voice strategies relate to
their ability to influence the outcome of a service through some
form of participation or articulation of protest or feedback.
Voice strategies in the health sector can be through the ‘short
route’ to accountability between service providers and users
(e.g., through involvement of the public or communities in
monitoring of services, strengthening consumer power to
complain, or making the income of service providers dependent
on accountability to users), or through the ‘long route’ to
accountability between governments and citizens, which in-
volves broader social and political change (Standing 2004). The
use of either or both of these strategies, together with the more
traditional accountability measures, determines overall levels of
public accountability.
Accountability problems are found in health systems the
world over, but there are particular problems in developing
countries where governments have often failed to provide
adequate public sector services for their citizens (Standing
2004). This concern has contributed to an increasing emphasis
on direct public engagement in health delivery in developing
countries. Strengthening community accountability is promoted
as a right in itself, and to enhance quality of care, appropri-
ateness of health service delivery for users, and patient
satisfaction and utilization (Cornwall et al. 2000; Standing
2004; World Bank 2004). Although there is a long history of
community participation in the public health system, particu-
larly in health education and disease prevention, the recent
shift in health service delivery is ‘away from users as recipients
of services designed for their benefit, towards communities
being active makers and shapers of services, exercising their
preferences as consumers and their rights as citizens’ (Cornwall
et al. 2000).
Mechanisms introduced to strengthen community account-
ability might be distinguished by expected impact (financial,
performance, or political/democratic), and by depth of commu-
nity involvement expected or achieved (Goetz and Gaventa
2001; Brinkerhoff 2004). Regarding depth of community
involvement, frameworks distinguish between simple informa-
tion giving to communities at one end of the spectrum, through
consultation, to community influence and control at the other
end (Arnstein 1969; Loewenson 2000). These frameworks
highlight that the creation of opportunities for consultation
do not in themselves lead to community influence and control,
and that there can be an element of ‘manipulation’ or
‘tokenism’ in initiatives. They also point to the importance of
issues of legitimacy, representation and health system–
community relations in community accountability. Overall,
community accountability arguably moves beyond community
participation in requiring the health system to be responsive to
the issues raised through participation. In this context,
‘responsiveness’ can be defined as changes made to the
health system on the basis of ideas or concerns raised by, or
with, community members through formally introduced deci-
sion-making mechanisms.
The potential intrinsic and instrumental benefits from
strengthening community accountability in health delivery
have led to significant resources being used by governments
and non-governmental organizations to introduce and improve
mechanisms. Some of these initiatives are linked to peripheral
health facilities, which are important sources of care for
low-income populations (Loewenson et al. 2004). Mechanisms
introduced include patient/citizen rights charters, suggestion
boxes, health and development committees, health clubs and
volunteers.
Given the international interest and potential importance of
community accountability, but also possible negative conse-
quences such as real or perceived manipulation of communities
and therefore inappropriate use of scare health system funds
for which there are competing demands, we reviewed the
available empirical literature on mechanisms linked to periph-
eral health facilities. We draw on this literature to propose a
conceptual framework for consideration in future research in
this important area.
Methods
We searched the published literature for empirical papers on
topics related to community involvement at peripheral health
facilities in low- or middle-income countries [LMICs, as defined
by Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD)] and systematically documented the process.
The search terms are shown in Table 1. We considered
descriptive and evaluation papers focusing on urban or rural
primary health care facilities (e.g., health centres, health posts,
dispensaries, community pharmacies), where the authors
described at least one measure to enhance community account-
ability that was linked with those facilities. We excluded papers
published before 1990, in languages other than English, and
where the setting was the hospital/district level. An initial
PubMed search was conducted in 2006, and cross-checked and
updated in late 2009. The papers identified were supplemented
by hand searches of the following websites: World Bank, World
Health Organization, Partnerships for Health Reform, id21 and
TARSC (Training and Research Support Centre).
Results
Papers screened and included
7825 papers were identified, 101 articles were selected for fur-
ther consideration and 59 rejected following a review of
the abstract. Seventeen of the remaining 42 papers were
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retained after reading the full text. The hand search of
websites identified a further four unpublished documents.
Basic details of the 21 final papers are presented in Table 2.
Half present data collected in sub-Saharan Africa. Other
countries included are India, Colombia, Mexico, Cuba, Peru
and Nepal. One paper includes comparisons across countries
(Gilson et al. 2001), and several compared findings between
facilities or areas within a country (Loewenson 2000; Few et al.
2003; Jacobs and Price 2003; Kyaddondo and Whyte 2003;
Loewenson et al. 2004; London et al. 2006; Mubyazi et al. 2007).
However, most papers focused on one or several health
centres or villages in one area. A mixture of government
initiatives and non-governmental organization (NGO) projects
were included.
Nine of the 21 papers presented both structured surveys and
qualitative work. The rest were qualitative studies, typically
combining document reviews with focus group discussions
(FGDs), individual interviews and observations. Individual
and group interviews involved those directly implementing
the accountability mechanisms, and—less frequently—those
expected to benefit from them (e.g., facility users or the wider
community), or those expected to oversee them or respond to
problems raised (e.g., supervisors or managers of health
facilities). Papers have a range of ‘endpoints’ of interest
(Table 2).
Several papers formally draw upon or feed into a theoretical
framework, including Franco et al.’s framework for analysing
the relations between health sector reform and health worker
motivation (Franco et al. 2002; Kyaddondo and Whyte 2003),
Sarriot et al.’s Sustainability Assessment Framework (Sarriot
et al. 2004a; Sarriot et al. 2004b; Jacobs et al. 2007), agency and
stewardship models as the basis for the role of the state in health
(Iwami and Petchey 2002), and Cohen and Uphoff’s framework
on dimensions and contexts of participation (Sepehri and
Pettigrew 1996). Zakus (1998) developed a theoretical frame-
work based on dependency theory (which postulates that
organizations will react to pressures in their external environ-
ment to secure the resources needed for survival), and Gilson
and Erasmus (2006) tested some initial ideas about linkages
between trust, accountability and health delivery. Loewensen
et al. (2004) present a conceptual framework including out-
comes/impacts, proximal factors/functioning, and underlying
factors of power and authority. Methodologically, the most
heavily drawn upon framework is Rifkin et al.’s approach to
describing and assessing community participation (see Figure 1)
(Rifkin et al. 1988).
The accountability mechanism most frequently covered was
committees (health centre and clinic committees, village health
committees and ward committees), followed by community
groups (in particular, women’s groups). Only two studies
covered other accountability mechanisms in detail;
London (2006) on patients’ rights charters, and Bjorkman
and Svensson (2009) on citizen report cards. Other mechanisms
such as suggestion boxes and health clubs were sometimes
mentioned in passing. We begin by reviewing data on commit-
tees and groups, and then turn briefly to the data on other
mechanisms, before discussing the issues raised across all
papers.
Table 1 Search terms used in searching electronic databases
Group Aa: Target
population (Combined by ‘OR’)
Group Ba: Geographic
location (Combined by ‘OR’)
Group Ca: Interventions
(Combined by ‘OR’)
Health cent* Third World countr* Consumer participation
Dispensar* Less-developed countr* Consumer involvement
Clinic* Sub-Saharan Africa* Community action*
Primary health care Low- and middle-income countr* Public participation
Rural health facilit* Developing countries [MeSH] Client voice
Peripheral health facilit* Africa South of the Sahara [MeSH] Community accountability
Community pharmac* Asia [MeSH] Community participation
Health post* Latin America [MeSH] Community consultation
First level facilit* Central America [MeSH] Community representation
Primary level facilit* South America [MeSH] Local government
Rural health servic* Poor resource countr* Committee*
Health system [List of all OECD-ranked LMICsb] Patients charter
Health care Community development forum*
Community health servic* Community involvement
Community health center* Social responsibil*
Group process*
Patient participation
a The three groups were ultimately combined with ‘AND’.
b Online at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/9/2488552.pdf
MeSH is a controlled vocabulary produced by the National Library of Medicine used for indexing articles and books
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C
ro
ss
-s
ec
ti
o
n
a
l
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
su
rv
ey
s
o
f
w
o
m
en

A
cc
ep
ta
n
ce
b
y
w
o
m
en
o
f
co
m
m
it
te
e
m
em
-
b
er
s
fo
r
st
im
u
la
ti
n
g
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
ti
o
n
in
h
ea
lt
h
-r
el
a
te
d
is
su
es
.

D
ep
th
u
si
n
g
R
if
k
in
’s
a
p
p
ro
a
ch
Ja
co
b
s
a
n
d
P
ri
ce
(2
0
0
6
)
a
n
d
Ja
co
b
s
et
al
.
(2
0
0
7
)
N
G
O
(D
is
tr
ic
t
co
n
tr
a
ct
ed
o
u
t
to
a
n
in
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l
N
G
O
si
n
ce
1
9
9
9
)

H
C
C
M
C
s
a
n
d
co
m
m
u
n
it
y-
b
a
se
d
o
rg
a
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
(P
a
g
o
d
a
st
ru
ct
u
re
s)
K
ir
iv
o
n
g
O
p
er
a
ti
o
n
a
l
H
ea
lt
h
D
is
tr
ic
t,
C
a
m
b
o
d
ia
H
ea
lt
h
ce
n
tr
es
(r
u
ra
l)

Q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
a
ir
es
a
d
m
in
is
te
re
d
to
eq
u
it
y
fu
n
d
b
en
ef
ic
ia
ri
es
a
n
d
n
o
n
-b
en
ef
ic
ia
ri
es

D
o
cu
m
en
t
re
vi
ew
(m
ee
ti
n
g
m
in
u
te
s)

F
G
D
s
w
it
h
H
C
C
M
C
ch
ie
fs

C
o
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
o
f
eq
u
it
y
fu
n
d
s
to
co
m
m
u
-
n
it
y
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
ti
o
n

S
u
st
a
in
a
b
il
it
y
o
ve
r
3
2
m
o
n
th
s;
m
ea
su
re
d
u
si
n
g
el
em
en
ts
a
n
d
in
d
ic
a
to
rs
li
n
k
ed
to
7
co
m
p
o
n
en
ts
a
d
a
p
te
d
fr
o
m
S
a
rr
io
t
et
al
.
2
0
0
4
a,
b
(e
.g
.
su
st
a
in
a
b
le
h
ea
lt
h
o
u
tc
o
m
es
,
o
rg
a
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
a
l
ca
p
a
ci
ty
,
co
m
m
u
n
it
y
ca
p
a
ci
ty
)
K
h
u
m
a
lo
(2
0
0
1
)
G
o
ve
rn
m
en
t

P
a
ti
en
ts
’
ri
g
h
ts
ch
a
rt
er
s

C
li
n
ic
co
m
m
it
te
es

H
o
m
e-
b
a
se
d
ca
re
a
n
d
su
p
p
o
rt
g
ro
u
p
s

C
o
m
m
u
n
it
y
d
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t
fo
ru
m
s
B
o
h
la
b
el
o
d
is
tr
ic
t,
L
im
p
o
p
o
P
ro
vi
n
ce
,
S
o
u
th
A
fr
ic
a
P
ri
m
a
ry
h
ea
lt
h
fa
ci
l-
it
ie
s,
m
a
in
ly
cl
in
ic
s
(r
u
ra
l)
4
ca
se
st
u
d
ie
s,
in
vo
lv
in
g
:

S
tr
u
ct
u
re
d
in
te
rv
ie
w
s

In
-d
ep
th
in
te
rv
ie
w
s

F
G
D
s

E
x
it
in
te
rv
ie
w
s

A
w
a
re
n
es
s
o
f
a
n
d
o
p
er
a
ti
o
n
a
l
fe
a
tu
re
s
o
f
m
ec
h
a
n
is
m
s
a
n
d
fa
ct
o
rs
in
fl
u
en
ci
n
g
fu
n
ct
io
n
in
g

In
fl
u
en
ce
o
f
m
ec
h
a
n
is
m
s
o
n
q
u
a
li
ty
o
f
ca
re
(f
o
cu
si
n
g
o
n
T
B
)

Im
p
a
ct
o
f
m
ec
h
a
n
is
m
s
o
n
:
en
co
u
ra
g
in
g
co
m
m
u
n
it
y
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
ti
o
n
;
en
su
ri
n
g
ex
-
p
la
n
a
ti
o
n
ca
n
b
e
so
u
g
h
t
fr
o
m
h
ea
lt
h
w
o
rk
er
s
a
b
o
u
t
d
ec
is
io
n
s
m
a
d
e;
m
a
k
in
g
h
ea
lt
h
w
o
rk
er
s
a
n
sw
er
a
b
le
;
a
n
d
o
ff
er
in
g
a
u
th
o
ri
ty
in
sa
n
ct
io
n
s
K
ya
d
d
o
n
d
o
a
n
d
W
h
yt
e
(2
0
0
3
)
G
o
ve
rn
m
en
t

D
is
tr
ic
t
h
ea
lt
h
co
m
m
it
te
es
,
su
b
-c
o
u
n
ty
h
ea
lt
h
co
m
m
it
te
es
a
n
d
h
ea
lt
h
u
n
it
m
a
n
a
g
em
en
t
co
m
m
it
te
es
(H
U
M
C
s)
T
o
ro
ro
a
n
d
B
u
si
a
d
is
-
tr
ic
ts
,
U
g
a
n
d
a
3
h
ea
lt
h
ce
n
tr
es
a
n
d
1
h
o
sp
it
a
l
(r
u
ra
l)

D
o
cu
m
en
t
re
vi
ew
a
n
d
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n

In
te
rv
ie
w
s
a
n
d
F
G
D
s
w
it
h
h
ea
lt
h
u
n
it
w
o
rk
er
s
a
n
d
co
m
m
it
te
e
m
em
b
er
s

H
ea
lt
h
w
o
rk
er
s’
p
er
ce
p
ti
o
n
s
o
f
re
la
ti
o
n
-
sh
ip
b
et
w
ee
n
h
ea
lt
h
se
ct
o
r
re
fo
rm
a
n
d
h
ea
lt
h
w
o
rk
er
m
o
ti
va
ti
o
n
L
o
n
d
o
n
et
al
.
(2
0
0
6
)
G
o
ve
rn
m
en
t

P
a
ti
en
ts
’
ri
g
h
ts
ch
a
rt
er
s
N
a
ti
o
n
a
l
le
ve
l,
a
n
d
W
es
te
rn
C
a
p
e
a
n
d
L
im
p
o
p
o
P
ro
vi
n
ce
s,
S
o
u
th
A
fr
ic
a
8
cl
in
ic
s,
a
n
d
1
0
d
is
-
tr
ic
t
a
n
d
re
g
io
n
a
l
h
o
sp
it
a
ls
(r
u
ra
l
a
n
d
u
rb
a
n
)
Q
u
a
li
ta
ti
ve
ra
p
id
a
p
p
ra
is
a
l
in
cl
u
d
in
g
in
te
r-
vi
ew
s
w
it
h
:

N
a
ti
o
n
a
l,
p
ro
vi
n
ci
a
l
a
n
d
lo
ca
l
a
u
th
o
ri
ty
a
ct
o
rs

H
ea
lt
h
m
a
n
a
g
er
s
in
tw
o
p
ro
vi
n
ce
s

A
ra
n
g
e
o
f
st
a
k
eh
o
ld
er
s
a
t
n
in
e
fa
ci
li
ti
es
a
cr
o
ss
tw
o
p
ro
vi
n
ce
s

A
tt
it
u
d
es
,
ex
p
er
ie
n
ce
s
a
n
d
b
eh
a
vi
o
u
rs
w
it
h
re
g
a
rd
s
to
p
a
ti
en
ts
’
ri
g
h
ts
ch
a
rt
er
s,
a
n
d
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
s
a
n
d
si
m
il
a
ri
ti
es
b
et
w
ee
n
g
ro
u
p
s

F
a
ct
o
rs
in
fl
u
en
ci
n
g
th
e
a
b
o
ve
L
o
ew
en
so
n
et
al
.
(2
0
0
4
)
G
o
ve
rn
m
en
t

H
ea
lt
h
ce
n
tr
e
co
m
m
it
te
es
(H
C
C
S
;
co
m
m
it
te
es
in
it
ia
te
d
o
r
re
vi
ta
li
ze
d
b
y
th
e
C
o
m
m
u
n
it
y
W
o
rk
in
g
G
ro
u
p
o
n
H
ea
lt
h
,
w
h
ic
h
h
a
s
ci
vi
c
o
rg
a
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
m
em
b
er
sh
ip
)
G
o
ro
m
o
n
zi
,
M
a
k
o
n
i
a
n
d
G
w
er
u
D
is
tr
ic
ts
,
Z
im
b
a
b
w
e
H
C
C
s
(r
u
ra
l
a
n
d
u
rb
a
n
)
M
ix
ed
m
et
h
o
d
o
lo
g
y
st
u
d
y
co
m
p
a
ri
n
g
4
w
a
rd
s
w
it
h
a
n
d
4
w
a
rd
s
w
it
h
o
u
t
H
C
C
s,
in
cl
u
d
in
g
:

C
ro
ss
-s
ec
ti
o
n
a
l
su
rv
ey
s

K
ey
in
fo
rm
a
n
t
in
te
rv
ie
w
s

F
G
D
s
u
si
n
g
a
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
to
ry
a
ss
es
sm
en
t
to
o
l

C
a
se
st
u
d
ie
s
o
n
k
ey
em
er
g
in
g
is
su
es

R
el
a
ti
o
n
sh
ip
b
et
w
ee
n
H
C
C
s
a
n
d
fa
ci
li
ti
es

R
ep
re
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
o
f
co
m
m
u
n
it
y
in
te
re
st
s
in
h
ea
lt
h
p
la
n
n
in
g
a
n
d
m
a
n
a
g
em
en
t
a
t
h
ea
lt
h
ce
n
tr
es

A
ll
o
ca
ti
o
n
o
f
re
so
u
rc
es
to
h
ea
lt
h
ce
n
tr
e
le
ve
l,
to
co
m
m
u
n
it
y
h
ea
lt
h
a
n
d
to
p
re
-
ve
n
ti
ve
se
rv
ic
es

C
o
m
m
u
n
it
y
a
cc
es
s
to
a
n
d
co
ve
ra
g
e
b
y
h
ea
lt
h
in
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
s

Im
p
ro
ve
d
q
u
a
li
ty
o
f
ca
re
M
eu
w
is
se
n
(2
0
0
2
)
H
ea
lt
h
ce
n
tr
e
co
m
m
it
te
es
T
il
la
b
er
i
D
is
tr
ic
t,
N
ig
er
R
u
ra
l
h
ea
lt
h
ce
n
tr
es
C
a
se
st
u
d
y
in
cl
u
d
in
g
:
(c
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
)
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T
a
b
le
2
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
P
a
p
e
r
re
fe
re
n
ce
A
cc
o
u
n
ta
b
il
it
y
m
e
ch
a
n
is
m
(s
);
N
G
O
/g
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t
in
it
ia
ti
v
e
,
a
n
d
ty
p
e
G
e
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
a
l
co
v
e
ra
g
e
T
y
p
e
a
n
d
lo
ca
ti
o
n
o
f
h
e
a
lt
h
fa
ci
li
ti
e
s
D
a
ta
co
ll
e
ct
io
n
m
e
th
o
d
s
E
n
d
p
o
in
ts

L
it
er
a
tu
re
re
vi
ew

D
a
ta
co
ll
ec
te
d
b
y
h
ea
lt
h
w
o
rk
er
s

O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
o
f
d
is
tr
ic
t
a
ct
iv
it
ie
s

P
o
li
cy
m
ee
ti
n
g
s
S
o
ci
o
-e
co
n
o
m
ic
a
n
d
so
ci
o
-o
rg
a
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
a
l
p
ro
b
le
m
s
th
a
t
co
n
tr
ib
u
te
d
to
a
w
el
l-
fo
rm
u
la
te
d
p
ro
g
ra
m
m
e
o
n
co
st
re
co
v-
er
y
fa
il
in
g
to
p
er
fo
rm
M
o
g
en
se
n
a
n
d
N
d
u
lu
b
e
(2
0
0
1
)
G
o
ve
rn
m
en
t
(w
it
h
su
p
p
o
rt
fr
o
m
D
A
N
ID
A
)

F
a
ci
li
ty
co
m
m
it
te
es
4
p
ro
vi
n
ce
s
in
Z
a
m
b
ia
;
3
d
is
tr
ic
ts
p
er
p
ro
vi
n
ce
R
u
ra
l
h
ea
lt
h
fa
ci
li
ti
es
Q
u
a
li
ta
ti
ve
co
m
p
o
n
en
t
o
f
a
w
id
er
h
ea
lt
h
re
fo
rm
ev
a
lu
a
ti
o
n
in
cl
u
d
in
g
:

F
G
D
s

In
d
iv
id
u
a
l
in
-d
ep
th
in
te
rv
ie
w
s
T
h
e
w
id
er
st
u
d
y
lo
o
k
ed
a
t
im
p
le
m
en
ta
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
re
fo
rm
.
O
f
in
te
re
st
in
th
is
p
a
p
er
is
h
o
w
k
ey
st
a
k
eh
o
ld
er
s
re
la
te
to
o
n
e
a
n
o
th
er
,
a
n
d
h
o
w
th
es
e
re
la
ti
o
n
sh
ip
s
a
re
im
p
a
ct
ed
o
n
b
y
re
fo
rm
s
M
o
sq
u
er
a
et
al
.
(2
0
0
1
)

In
d
iv
id
u
a
l
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
ti
o
n

C
u
st
o
m
er
se
rv
ic
e
o
ff
ic
es

U
se
r
a
ss
o
ci
a
ti
o
n
s
C
a
li
d
is
tr
ic
t,
C
o
lo
m
b
ia
P
ri
m
a
ry
le
ve
l
h
o
sp
it
a
l/
h
ea
lt
h
ce
n
tr
es
(r
u
ra
l
a
n
d
u
rb
a
n
)
M
ix
ed
m
et
h
o
d
o
lo
g
y
st
u
d
y

G
ro
u
p
d
is
cu
ss
io
n
s

S
tr
u
ct
u
re
d
a
n
d
se
m
i-
st
ru
ct
u
re
d
in
te
rv
ie
w
s
T
h
e
so
ci
a
l
re
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
s
o
f
d
if
fe
re
n
t
a
ct
o
rs
(p
o
li
cy
m
a
k
er
s,
ci
vi
l
se
rv
a
n
ts
,
u
se
r
a
ss
o
ci
-
a
ti
o
n
s
a
n
d
u
se
rs
)
th
a
t
m
a
y
h
in
d
er
o
r
en
a
b
le
ef
fe
ct
iv
e
im
p
le
m
en
ta
ti
o
n
o
f
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
to
ry
p
o
li
cy
M
u
b
ya
zi
et
al
.
(2
0
0
7
)

V
il
la
g
e
D
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t
C
o
m
m
it
te
es

W
a
rd
D
ev
el
o
p
m
en
t
C
o
m
m
it
te
es
L
u
sh
o
to
a
n
d
M
u
h
ez
a
d
is
tr
ic
ts
,
T
a
n
za
n
ia
R
u
ra
l
a
n
d
u
rb
a
n
co
m
-
m
u
n
it
y
h
ea
lt
h
ce
n
tr
es
E
x
p
lo
ra
to
ry
ca
se
st
u
d
y

M
u
lt
i-
st
a
g
e
sa
m
p
li
n
g
:
4
vi
ll
a
g
es
p
er
d
is
tr
ic
t

F
G
D
s
w
it
h
co
m
m
it
te
e
m
em
b
er
s
a
n
d
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s
C
o
m
m
u
n
it
y
k
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
o
f
h
ea
lt
h
se
ct
o
r
re
p
o
rt
,
th
ei
r
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
ti
o
n
in
h
ea
lt
h
p
ri
o
ri
ty
se
tt
in
g
,
a
n
d
h
o
w
co
m
m
it
te
es
p
er
fo
rm
th
ei
r
d
u
ti
es
in
re
la
ti
o
n
to
co
m
m
u
n
it
y
ex
p
ec
ta
ti
o
n
S
ch
m
id
t
a
n
d
R
if
k
in
(1
9
9
6
)

W
o
m
en
g
ro
u
p
s

V
il
la
g
e
h
ea
lt
h
co
m
m
it
te
es
L
u
sh
o
to
d
is
tr
ic
t,
T
a
n
za
n
ia
R
u
ra
l
h
ea
lt
h
ce
n
tr
e
D
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
ca
se
st
u
d
y

G
ro
u
p
a
n
d
k
ey
in
fo
rm
a
n
t
in
te
rv
ie
w
s

P
a
rt
ic
ip
a
n
t
a
n
d
n
o
n
-p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
n
t
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n

R
ev
ie
w
o
f
re
le
va
n
t
d
o
cu
m
en
ts
w
B
re
a
d
th
o
f
co
m
m
u
n
it
y
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
ti
o
n
in
n
ee
d
s
a
ss
es
sm
en
t,
le
a
d
er
sh
ip
,
o
rg
a
n
iz
a
ti
o
n
,
re
-
so
u
rc
e
m
o
b
il
iz
a
ti
o
n
,
a
n
d
m
a
n
a
g
em
en
t
S
ep
eh
ri
a
n
d
P
et
ti
g
re
w
(1
9
9
6
)
G
o
ve
rn
m
en
t
a
n
d
N
G
O

V
il
la
g
e
h
ea
lt
h
co
m
m
it
te
es
T
w
o
vi
ll
a
g
es
li
n
k
ed
to
a
n
N
G
O
in
N
ep
a
l
C
o
m
m
u
n
it
y-
ru
n
h
ea
lt
h
p
o
st
a
n
d
st
a
te
-r
u
n
h
ea
lt
h
p
o
st
;
b
o
th
ru
ra
l
S
m
a
ll
sc
a
le
d
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
st
u
d
y

Q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
a
ir
e
g
u
id
ed
in
te
rv
ie
w
s

P
a
rt
ic
ip
a
n
t
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n

P
er
so
n
a
l
in
te
rv
ie
w
s
E
x
te
n
t
to
w
h
ic
h
co
m
m
u
n
it
y
fi
n
a
n
ci
n
g
w
id
en
ed
sc
o
p
e
a
n
d
ex
te
n
t
o
f
p
a
rt
ic
ip
a
ti
o
n
U
zo
ch
u
k
w
u
et
al
.
(2
0
0
4
)
G
o
ve
rn
m
en
t

D
is
tr
ic
t
a
n
d
vi
ll
a
g
e
h
ea
lt
h
co
m
m
it
te
es
O
ji
R
iv
er
L
o
ca
l
G
o
ve
rn
m
en
t
A
re
a
,
E
n
u
g
u
S
ta
te
,
N
ig
er
ia
R
u
ra
l
h
ea
lt
h
ce
n
tr
es

F
G
D
s
w
it
h
co
m
m
it
te
e
m
em
b
er
s

P
a
rt
ic
ip
a
n
t
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
o
f
co
m
m
it
te
e
m
ee
ti
n
g
s

H
ea
lt
h
fa
ci
li
ty
in
ch
a
rg
e
q
u
es
ti
o
n
n
a
ir
e

K
n
o
w
le
d
g
e
o
f
a
n
d
sa
ti
sf
a
ct
io
n
w
it
h
co
m
m
it
te
es

In
vo
lv
em
en
t
o
f
co
m
m
it
te
es
in
th
e
h
ea
lt
h
ce
n
tr
e

C
o
m
m
it
te
e
m
em
b
er
a
n
d
d
is
tr
ic
t
st
a
ff
a
w
a
re
n
es
s
o
f
a
n
d
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Committees and groups
Origin and intended role of groups and
committees—intervention ‘content’
Most papers discuss committees or groups of some form,
some health specific (Gilson et al. 2001; Mogensen and Ngulube
2001), and others with a broader remit such as community
development, with health being only one component (Gilson
and Erasmus 2006; Mubyazi et al. 2007).
Government initiatives tend to be implemented through
bureaucratic mechanisms, should in theory receive regular
programmatic support and resources, and are therefore often at
least intended to be implemented on a large scale (Zakus 1998).
Many papers discussing committees covered government-
supported committees that were part of the routine health
system setup, typically initiated as part of public service
decentralization. Several papers deal with NGO-supported
projects (Meuwissen 2002; Few et al. 2003; Jacobs and Price
2006; Jacobs et al. 2007). NGO initiatives often have more
resources over a smaller area, and greater ability to engage
existing community-based organizations.
While committee roles were not always clearly articulated in
papers, health committees were often part of a wider set of
interventions aimed at improving the effectiveness of health
systems, quality of care and management of health centres,
and community involvement in health. Roles typically
incorporated:
 promoting active participation in decision-making by com-
munity representatives, and
 wider information and consultation with communities in
general through discussion of issues relating to health
facilities.
Committee membership often included a health worker
representative, members of the local community, and appointed
key figures. Eligibility and nomination/election processes were
sometimes clearly specified. Two examples from Nigeria and
Cambodia, respectively:
‘Committees consist of the person in charge of the health centre
(who is the link between the government and the community), the
primary school headmaster (who is the secretary), representatives of
religious and women’s groups/associations, representative of the Red
Cross and Boys Scout organization, a representative of the town
union, and some drawn from age group and pensioner’s associ-
ations.’ (Uzochukwu et al. 2004, p. 158)
‘The recommended membership of the HCCMC [Health Centre
Co-Management Committee] is three health centre staff, plus an
elected community representative from each of the (an average of
two) communities covered by the health centre . . .Membership of
the FBCs [Feedback Committees] is larger, with the ‘ideal’ being
the entire HCCMC plus a male and female elected representative
from each village served by the health centre . . .members of both
committees should be elected by the community they represent, with
a mandatory 50% of village households required to turn out for
such elections.’ (Jacobs and Price 2003, p. 401)
Most papers reported that committee members were trained
in their roles, but as discussed in greater detail below, roles
were often not clearly defined, and resources allocated to
training were sometimes inadequate.
Reported achievements and impacts of committees and groups
Some impressive achievements were reported. In Cambodia for
example, community participation was structured around
Pagoda volunteers1 and involved managing an equity fund to
provide user fee exemptions. The use of Pagoda volunteers was
found to be a more effective and sustainable way of involving
communities than establishing new community structures with
formally elected representatives (Jacobs and Price 2003).
Committee members were more accepting of their assigned
duties in the Pagoda project areas, and mothers in villages with
a Pagoda were more likely to disclose personal problems to
committee members (75% vs 58%; P¼ 0.02). In a subsequent
study the authors showed using surveys and spider diagrams
that Pagoda volunteers were able to improve financial access for
the poorest to public health services, and to increase the level of
community participation in health. Working through the
Pagoda structure was considered relatively sustainable and
replicable (Jacobs et al. 2007).
In Zimbabwe, four wards with Health Centre Committees
(HCCs) performed better than four without, including in level
of health resources within clinics, service coverage and com-
munity health indicators (Loewenson et al. 2004). The associ-
ation between HCCs and improved health outcomes was
observed even in highly under-resourced communities and
clinics. In Peru, local health committees based on grassroots
Figure 1 Spider diagrams to describe and assess community
participation
Note: In Rifkin’s approach level of community involvement in each of
five factors considered to influence the breadth or depth of community
participation in a community health programme is considered by the
assessment team on the basis of data collection and discussion. The
five factors are needs assessment, leadership, organization, resource
mobilization, and management. To show visually levels of community
participation, a spider diagram is drawn (see Figure). For each factor,
the breadth of community involvement is based on a consensus reached
by the assessment team, with widest participation being marked
furthest from the central point, and narrowest closest to the central
point. The points on each line are then linked with each other, allowing
the breadth of community participation to be visualized.
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self-help circles that developed during the 1980s reportedly
identified unmet health needs at the local level, generated and
effectively allocated resources to meet those needs, and
developed a payment system that protected the poorest
groups (Iwami and Petchey 2002). Regarding the latter, 25.1%
of services of committee-run establishments were free at the
point of use compared with 14.7% in sites run by the Ministry
of Health.2
Even in these successful cases, there were limitations to the
achievements. For example, in Zimbabwe HCCs were not well
known in the community, and although their functions
included identifying priority health problems in the community,
they did not have a direct influence over core budgets, and had
little influence on how their clinics were managed and
run (Loewenson et al. 2004). With the Local Committees for
Health Administration (CLAS) system in Peru, many commit-
tees were reportedly under-resourced, inadequately supported
and poorly integrated with the national health system.
In places, the system therefore remained fragile (Iwami and
Petchey 2002).
In other settings, the impact was found to be at best more
mixed, and at worst negative. For example:
 In Zambia and Dar es Salaam, participatory observations
suggested that committees were taking on an increasing role
in monitoring, planning and management, and building up
a sense of ownership (Few et al. 2003). Users were
reportedly voicing more complaints, in part due to improved
awareness of their rights. However, the success of commit-
tees in prompting health-related activities in the commu-
nities by independent groups, as opposed to by themselves,
was reportedly more mixed.
 In Nigeria, interviewee comments suggested that community
participation was enhanced through the Bamako Initiative,
with committees being involved in health activities, the
provision of equipment, and identifying those deserving
exemption from fees (Uzochukwu et al. 2004). However,
committee members complained of exclusion from the
co-management of user fees and revolving funds, and
from priority setting or decision making.
 Several studies suggested that mechanisms have not been
thoroughly institutionalized. In Tanzania, Mubyazi et al.
(2007) described community participation as ‘rhetoric’
rather than ‘reality’. In Niger, Meuwissen (2002) reported
that despite their initial enthusiasm, health centre commit-
tees failed to execute effective control over the administra-
tion of drugs and finance.
 In Oaxaca state in Mexico, Zakus’ interviews and observa-
tions in over 40 health facilities revealed that auxiliaries and
committee members were not given due recognition in
terms of infrastructure, resources, support and training, and
that they had no input into their communities’ health
service targets and programmes. He concluded that the
participatory structures and processes in that part of Mexico
were ‘devoid of present purpose and future potential’, and that
they had in fact become ‘additional dependencies of the health
system . . .’ (Zakus 1998, p. 491). He reported that once
community members were co-opted into the system, they
were compromised into maintaining their obligations,
although with little chance of performing them well. He
notes that ‘. . . perhaps the greatest issue is that so much potential
was being lost and systematically ignored’ (Zakus 1998, p. 491).
Factors influencing impact of groups and committees
Together the papers offer a rich range of almost entirely
qualitative data on factors that influenced if and how commit-
tees and groups meet their intended objectives. These can
be grouped into three inter-related areas: the selection, com-
position and functioning of groups and committees; relation-
ships between committee members, health workers and health
managers; and elements of the wider context.
1. Selection, composition and general functioning
Clearly a first step in the influence of groups and committees is
whether or not they are successfully set up and whether they
meet at all (Sepehri and Pettigrew 1996; Zakus 1998; Mubyazi
et al. 2007). In South Africa, qualitative work found that some
wards had not established committees, despite it being a
government health policy and health workers being supportive
of the idea in interviews (Gilson and Erasmus 2006). Where
committees had been established, there appeared to be a lack of
consistent and regular functioning. For example there were
problems with keeping to meeting schedules and having
quorum, leading to malfunctioning and high numbers of
dropouts. As one committee member described:
‘‘. . .we have not been holding regular meetings, not attending
some workshops like any other wards. In that note we ended up
being torn apart as ward committee members. Now I think we
were left with 4 or 5 persistent members in the ward committee.’’
(Gilson and Erasmus 2006, p. 17)
Part of the problem was linked to selection and composition
of committee members. In practice, the selection of represen-
tatives was rarely democratic or transparent. In Niger for
example, many committee members appeared from observation
to be selected by the village chiefs, and the treasurer or ‘cash
keeper’ was often seen to be closely related to other committee
members or to the chief (Meuwissen 2002). The domination of
males in committees, and of the relatively affluent or politically
prominent or powerful, was also noted by others (Sepehri and
Pettigrew 1996; Gilson et al. 2001; Loewenson et al. 2004).
Concerns with selection processes included that committee
members had sought office for personal and political gain, that
they did not represent the concerns of the wider community, or
that they lacked leadership and administrative and technical
skills. In Nepal for example, villagers were not only generally
unaware of the existence of a committee, they also held
differing views from health committee members about the
quality of services provided by the village health centre (Sepehri
and Pettigrew 1996). Problems of the link between committees
and community members were also indicated in other studies
(Gilson et al. 2001; Few et al. 2003; Loewenson et al. 2004), with
some reporting significant mistrust between the two groups
(Mubyazi et al. 2007). In Niger, committee members being
closely related to each other led to difficulties in dealing with
their misappropriation of funds (Meuwissen 2002).
The above problems contribute to and result from a range of
factors reported qualitatively in studies, including an unclear
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mandate, reporting structure and legal position for many
committees, lack of incentives for committee members,
inaccessibility of some areas and difficulties of communication,
and inadequate time and resources dedicated to training and
supervision (Mogensen and Ngulube 2001; Iwami and Petchey
2002; Few et al. 2003; Loewenson et al. 2004; Gilson and
Erasmus 2006).
Regarding clarity in role, there remained particular uncer-
tainty, confusion and sometimes conflict regarding extent of
decision-making power, which in practice was often limited. As
an FGD participant in South Africa commented:
‘‘. . .we did not think that we are supposed to do that [influence
health care]. We do not have authority to do that. The government
has not informed us to do that. Maybe occasionally, when we meet
nurses in the community we would remind them that their job is
to assist people who are sick. But it ends there.’’ (Khumalo
2001, p. 44)
Lack of incentives was highlighted in several papers.
Meuwissen, for example, reported that committee members
complained often about lack of financial rewards:
‘Committee members complained a lot about the lack of incentives
for their time and investment. Being in need of money, handling
thousands of [local currency] and having to understand that there
is no money to be paid, appeared to be very difficult.’ (Meuwissen
2002, p. 307)
Possibly linked to a lack of incentives, in one study committee
members were reportedly seeking exemptions for themselves
and their families, leading to concerns among health workers
that committee members were potentially reducing facility
revenue (Khumalo 2001). Meuwissen (2002) highlights the
centrality of the issue of motivation by suggesting that a
fundamental question is ‘why should community members be
motivated to commit themselves to the tedious task of regularly
performing administrative supervision correctly over a long period of
time’ (p. 312).
Building upon existing well-functioning community-based
structures appeared to overcome some of the above challenges.
For example, the success in rural Cambodia was largely
attributed to the existing system of formally elected volunteers
who were held in high esteem within their local communities
(Jacobs and Price 2003; Jacobs et al. 2007). Pagodas and
associated volunteers appeared to offer the advantages of
established (and apparently trusted) leadership, local organiza-
tion, resource mobilization and management. These are all
areas that need to be carefully built up in new organizations, a
process that takes time and resources. Within the Pagodas the
pivotal role of key authorities, and the importance of involving
them in facility interactions, was also noted. In other settings or
situations, community members may be selected from commu-
nity groups which themselves have difficulties in negotiating
and managing internal political, organizational and finan-
cial issues (Mogensen and Ngulube 2001). It is therefore by
no means guaranteed that these groups have democratic
decision-making processes, or that they have systems to
incorporate or link to the more vulnerable groups.
2. Relationships between committees/groups, health workers
and health management systems
Communities are never homogeneous, and initiatives almost
always include one party encouraging another to take part.
Community accountability is therefore inevitably embedded
in social relations and power struggles (Mogensen and
Ngulube 2001).
A key relationship for accountability mechanisms involving
health facilities is between health workers and committee
members. Realistically, committees cannot arise, be sustained
and actively participate in health services without invitation
and support from those that they deal with directly within the
health care system (Mogensen and Ngulube 2001). However,
imbalances in information and power often lead to health
workers controlling committees (Gilson et al. 2001; Mogensen
and Ngulube 2001; Few et al. 2003). As a result, committees can
come to be seen as bodies designed to serve health centre
objectives rather than community members (Few et al. 2003).
Alternatively, community members may come to see health care
as the prerogative of the government, or doubt their ability to
influence policy:
‘‘[what] we often fear is that nurses will think that since we did
not go to school we are talking rubbish, what will we do if we go to
the clinic and these nurses ask us whether we understand the
questions we are asking them? What are we going to say? We are
uneducated; therefore we would not know how to answer any
questions. Nurses might even say we went to the clinic to rule
them . . .’’ (Khumalo 2001, p. 44)
Similarly, health workers may be unhappy with community
supervision and management of facilities, seeing it as interfer-
ence in their work by unqualified people (Mosquera et al. 2001).
This might relate to personal losses by health workers.
Kyaddondo and Whyte (2003), for example, report that closer
monitoring of health workers by committees and the necessity
for health units to generate income led to health workers’
professional autonomy being infringed, and to loss of control
over health care resources within the clinic (e.g., misappropri-
ation of drugs, informal charging of patients and mismanage-
ment of health unit funds) and outside (e.g., treating patients
in their homes, running clinics and drug shops, selling
medicine, and engaging in agriculture and trade). Ultimately,
they reported that the social value and respect of the health
worker was potentially affected by the presence of a committee.
Such concerns may explain why health workers do not always
want to open up financial information to the community
(Uzochukwu et al. 2004).
Mogensen and Ngulube (2001) argue that while the presence
of users or their representatives has had positive consequences
(e.g., health workers being disciplined and even sacked as a
result of poor behaviour), government/community member
relations have also been affected in unintended and sometimes
damaging ways. Specifically, health workers are finding them-
selves in the centre of increasingly strained relations between
the government and community members:
‘Health workers experience that they deliver services which are
compensated or reciprocated neither by their employers (the
government), since salaries are meagre and working conditions
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bad, nor from below, since patients’ contributions are not making a
noticeable difference to the health workers’ living standards. In
addition, users feel that due to the fees they pay (which do make a
noticeable economic difference for them) they can make higher
demands upon the health workers. The latter, however, only rarely
have the resources with which to make any noticeable difference in
quality of service. They therefore lose dignity in the eye of the
‘donors’ (the patients and the administrators who each pay them).’
(Mogensen and Ngulube 2001, p. 24)
The above shows the vital role that health managers poten-
tially play in facility-based community accountability mechan-
isms (Mosquera et al. 2001). How do district managers support
and supervise selection of committee members and committee
functioning? How high do managers prioritize responding to
community issues and concerns in their range of activities? As
Meuwissen suggests, another fundamental question to ask
regarding why some mechanisms fail is:
‘why would district health team members be motivated to commit
themselves to the [often] tedious task of administrative supervision
and consider this as a normal part of their duties?’ (Meuwissen
2002, p. 312)
3. Broader contextual issues
Two important aspects identified as affecting the applicability
and implementation of committees/groups were the govern-
ment context and socio-cultural norms and priorities.
Regarding government control, of interest is the primary
care level of the health system in which committees operate.
Loewenson et al. (2004) note that in Zimbabwe there is a
virtuous cycle between the strength of the primary health care
system and that of HCCs, with each positively reinforcing each
other. Health worker outreach and reasonable investments in
primary health care were noted to be important to trigger this
virtuous cycle. In all settings, committee achievements will
inevitably be compromised where they are given inadequate
resources and power to make decisions in practice, or where
local and national governments are inexperienced in responding
to community members’ concerns (Mosquera et al. 2001). An
underlying issue is whether committees really are a response to
a felt local need, or more a need to comply with policy
directives on community participation that are enforced from
above (Gilson and Erasmus 2006), often from outside the
country. Zakus argues that community participation in the
module programme in Mexico was implemented for its utility
in supplying resources, rather than for democratic or intrinsic
purposes, leading to major flaws in the participatory process
and unimpressive health outcomes:
‘[the Ministry’s centralized organizational structure] was insensi-
tive to the important issues of community development. It lacked
the desire to share power and let the communities make decisions,
it failed to provide needed resources, and it lacked the capacity to
embrace a multisectoral perspective.’ (Zakus 1998, p. 492)
From Niger, Meuwissen reported similarly that:
‘the health service approach to community participation was, in
effect, imposed – the communities were given the responsibility for
the administration of the system but they had never asked for it,
and did not take it on. Government officials advocated this
approach as empowerment of the community, while it can be
explained alternatively as a way to shirk their own responsibility.’
(Meuwissen 2002, p. 312)
Socio-culturally, Sepehri and Pettigrew (1996) argue that
community participation is often conceptualized in western
cultural terms of individualism and equality, while some
societies are characterized by hierarchy, interdependence and
action through personal relationships and social networks. They
argue that in communities where people manipulate their
multiple connections for access to resources, goods and services,
where there are sharp divisions based on ethnicity, wealth,
gender and power, and where treatment-seeking involves very
contrasting ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ health care, the applic-
ability of community participation as envisaged through donors
and governments can be called into question. In other
communities, challenges may relate more to populations being
atomized (Gilson and Erasmus 2006). In contrast, in some
settings there are elements of socio-cultural norms and struc-
tures that appear to be highly suited to participatory mechan-
isms, such as the Pagoda system in Cambodia or the self-help
circles in Peru. Regardless of the direction of influence, issues
of politics and power within the wider community clearly play
out in the functioning of accountability structures. As
Mosquera et al. conclude:
‘. . . participation is not a matter of policies and legislation; it is a
complex process involving belief, customs, ways of life and power.’
(Mosquera et al. 2001, p. 58)
Other accountability mechanisms
Of the few studies on other mechanisms that were identified,
only two provided detailed empirical data: one on citizen
report cards (Bjorkman and Svensson 2009), and one on
patients’ rights charters (London et al. 2006). Other papers
provide additional information (McNamara 2006; London 2007),
but are not included in Table 2 due to insufficient empirical data.
Report cards
Provider report cards compare providers within a specified
geographic region on a routine basis according to certain
standards of quality performance. In public reports, providers
are named and performance data are presented to the
public, potentially improving choice and ability to dialogue
(McNamara 2006).
Bjorkman and Svensson (2009) present findings from a
randomized field experiment in 50 communities from nine
districts in Uganda with the primary objective of introducing
community-based monitoring, including the use of citizen
report cards. Local NGOs facilitated village and staff meetings
in which community members discussed health service delivery
relative to other providers and the government standard, and
steps the providers should take to improve health service
provision. A pre and post survey involving 5000 households,
and records from 50 dispensaries, suggested the intervention
was highly effective. There were improved health outcomes in
intervention areas, including a 33% reduction in under-five
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mortality (144 vs 97 deaths), and improvements throughout the
accountability chain (e.g., greater monitoring of providers by
community members, shorter waiting times at facilities and less
absenteeism). The authors attribute the success to overcoming
two problems in community participation and oversight: lack of
relevant information, and failure to agree on or co-ordinate
expectations of what is reasonable to demand from the
provider.
McNamara’s (2006) overview of report cards draws on data
from the Yellow Star Program implemented in 12 districts in
Uganda. Facilities were evaluated quarterly using 35 indicators,
and those receiving a 100% score for two consecutive quarters
had a yellow star posted prominently on the facility. This
intervention contributed to an improvement in average scores
from 47% in the first quarter to 65% in the second, and to plans
to scale up the programme nationwide. McNamara cautions,
however, that challenges in all settings include: success being
dependent on providers being able to respond to shortcomings,
monitoring, providers potentially performing to the measures
(i.e. focusing on those measured rather than other aspects of
care), and inadequate government support.
Patients’ rights charters
Patients’ charters are guidelines that target the relationship
between health professionals and users of health services,
providing information on standards of care that patients can
expect to receive and demand as a basic human right
(London 2006).
In South Africa, London (2006) observed that patients’ rights
posters and suggestion boxes were common in facilities, and
that facility staff and managers were often positive about the
charter and its ability to motivate staff. There were concerns
about sustainability of positive effects however, and many
negative sentiments and dynamics. Many providers, for
example, complained that the charter gave patients rights
without emphasizing their responsibilities, and led to patients
‘expecting miracles’ and to health workers being ‘taken
for granted’, and that it failed to recognize health workers’
own stresses and challenges. Ultimately, the charter was seen as
a threat or weapon, ‘a sword over the head of health workers’;
increasing stresses and strains rather than improving relations.
Some concerns were attributed to the charter itself: in aiming
to re-balance the power relations between providers and
patients it is bound to bring about discomfort. Other concerns
were the imposition of the intervention from above, inadequate
inclusion of health providers with real ‘field’ experience in
decision making, and inadequate support to local level under-
standing and adaptation of the charter. More broadly, in a
context of wider health system and community resource
constraints, a facility-focused charter was recognized to be
unable to address infrastructure-related issues essential for
improving quality of care.
In a later paper London touches again on patients’ rights
charters in South Africa and Malawi and civic organization
around health in Zimbabwe (London 2007). He highlights their
potential in providing community members with a standard for
negotiating quality of care with providers at their facilities.
However, he points to challenges when charters are not
developed with community input, and where they are
introduced in a context where civic structures tend to exercise
political patronage rather than play active roles on behalf of
civil society.
Discussion
There is a renewed drive in international policy and practice to
strengthen direct involvement of the public, citizens or users in
health delivery. We conducted a review of empirical studies
exploring the functioning and impact of mechanisms intro-
duced to strengthen community voices in peripheral health
facilities in developing countries. Our review was based on a
systematic search strategy, though we note the limitation of
including only papers in the English language, which may have
led to the exclusion of some studies from Francophone and
Lusophone Africa and from South America. Overall, we found
that the international interest in this area has not been
matched by empirical data. Research to date has focused on
health facility committees and other groups, with limited
information on other mechanisms.
Regarding the available empirical data, there are four meth-
odological points worth highlighting. First, many papers use the
term community ‘accountability’ in a way that overlaps with
the broader concepts of community ‘engagement’, ‘involvement’
and ‘participation’. Awareness of this potential contributed to
our inclusion of these broader terms in our literature search
(Table 1). However, the lack of precision in the literature on
definition of concepts can lead to challenges in comparing goals
and effects across programmes. Secondly, relatively few studies
presented good quality quantitative data using observable
measures of impact. More often, authors drew on views and
perceptions of the committees and community members, which
typically differed by stakeholder group (i.e. between health
workers and committee members, or committee members and
community members). While this is expected given the differ-
ent potential losses and gains by different parties, such
differences may also relate to interview bias.
Thirdly, a new accountability mechanism is often introduced
at the same time as other interventions with similar expected
impacts, including other accountability mechanisms and user
fee changes. For example, Few et al. (2003) point out that while
the greater sense of ownership of health facilities may reflect
the creation of the facility committees, it may also relate to the
payment of fees through cost-sharing schemes. There are
therefore numerous confounders which are difficult to account
for without control groups. Fourth, the most widely used
framework for assessing depth of community involvement
is Rifkin et al.’s spider diagram (Figure 1) (Rifkin et al. 1988).
This is a valuable tool given the differences of opinions and
views among key stakeholders, and the importance of under-
standing depth of involvement. However, a challenge is that
these diagrams are constructed based on the consensus reached
by an assessment team, with relatively little information
presented in papers on what data were collected to feed into
assessment teams’ deliberations, and how differences in opin-
ion and group dynamics among the assessment team itself were
handled.
The above caveats aside, the empirical literature suggests that
while there is significant potential for community involvement
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in peripheral facilities, there is also a range of challenges to
meeting this potential, including:
 Complexities around defining ‘communities’ and their ‘represen-
tatives’: individuals are often members of a range of different
communities, communities are far from homogenous (dif-
fering, for example, in age, gender, ethnicity and
socio-economic status), and mechanisms for selecting indi-
viduals to represent those communities can be highly prob-
lematic. While existing community structures can
be usefully engaged, these structures are themselves not
necessarily democratic in origin or in decision making.
 The functioning of community accountability mechanisms: particu-
lar challenges include members’ lack of clarity in roles and
responsibilities, avoiding politicization, dilemmas related to
voluntary participation/remuneration, difficulties in identify-
ing the extent to which views are held by different community
members, information and resource asymmetries between
health staff and community representatives, and building
trustful relationships in these contexts.
 Views on if, when and how to involve communities can differ
significantly between stakeholders, often leading to limited
depth of accountability. Within communities challenges may
include lack of awareness of rights, responsibilities and
representatives, and limited ability to engage with health
providers. Within health systems there may not be strong
perceived value given to community input, accountability
systems may discourage external influence, and there may
be inadequate mechanisms and motivation for co-ordination
and supervision. Community and heath system issues are all
affected by the wider social, political and cultural environ-
ment. Factors such as availability of democratic fora, focus
on human rights and availability of information can be key.
Given the paucity of published empirical data concerning
community accountability in health delivery in general (i.e. be-
yond peripheral health facilities), and the prominence it has
gained in policy and practice, many authors have called for
further research (Zakus 1998; Cornwall et al. 2000; Gilson et al.
2001; Standing 2004; World Bank 2004; Cornwall and
Nyamu-Musembi 2005; Mubyazi et al. 2007). Considering the
undeniable importance of qualitative research in this field, but
also the potential contribution of quantitative data, we propose
mixed methodology experimental studies wherever possible.
Such studies will need to take into account the challenges
suggested above and those outlined by Abelson and Gauvin
(2006), including:
 Difficulties in defining end-points: impacts can take years
and may be difficult to disentangle from other events;
 Public participation activities may be well run according to
some criteria but not others; and
 The problems of perceived vs actual impact, and the
shortage of properly tested measurement tools.
On the basis of the above review, and drawing on policy analysis
frameworks (Gilson et al. 2008; Gilson and Raphaely 2008; Walt
et al. 2008; Buse et al. 2009), future research would benefit from
carefully considering four inter-related areas (Figure 2):
 Content: What is the design of the accountability mechan-
ism and how is it supposed to work? Which aspects of
service delivery are expected to be impacted upon and how?
What is the depth of community involvement planned at
each stage of a policy or programme?
 Process: How is the accountability mechanism actually
working? How is the mechanism incorporated in practice
into the health system hierarchy?
 Context: What are the wider contextual issues—at the
health system, national, international and community
levels—that might influence the above areas? Particularly
key for community accountability mechanisms linked to
health facilities are likely to be health system factors
including functioning of the primary care system, level and
form of decentralization, and other forms of accountability
in place, all of which can influence decision-making space to
respond to community demands (Bossert 1998; Bossert and
Beauvais 2002).
 Impact: The above factors are together likely to influence
impact, or ‘responsiveness’ of the health facility or health
system to ideas or concerns formally raised by community
members or their representatives. Although the ultimate
goal of responding to community views is to improve health
outcomes, measuring this impact is beyond the scope of
many studies.
Ideally, future studies would include both process and
outcome evaluation data. Given the centrality of depth of
community involvement, both as a goal in itself and in being
key to responsiveness, the measurement of this concept requires
special consideration. We suggest drawing on Rifkin’s spider
diagrams and on the tables presented in Murthy and
Klugman’s paper (Murthy and Klugman 2004) to design tools
which assist in the collection of data to be discussed by
different stakeholders, including the assessment team. Murthy
and Klugman’s tables, and earlier work by others including, for
example, Arnstein (1969), highlight the different potential
degrees of participation that may underpin interventions, and
how these might influence the definition of community,
rationale for community participation, and scope and mode of
participation employed.
Conclusion
Strengthening direct involvement of the public, citizens or users
in health delivery should be supported by carefully designed
empirical studies. Relatively little empirical information is
available currently regarding mechanisms linked to peripheral
facilities. The available data suggest that such initiatives will
face challenges in relation to defining communities, in day to
day functioning, and with regards to support at community,
facility and at higher levels. Nevertheless, recent studies
illustrate the potential of such interventions, and study designs
that are valuable in contributing to the evidence base. We have
presented a framework in this paper which we feel would be
valuable in future studies on related topics.
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Endnotes
1 Volunteers from the monasteries for Buddhist monks and the temples
for Buddhist religious ceremonies.
2 We were not able to obtain the full report of this evaluation with all of
the relevant quantitative data, only the published paper which
summarizes the key findings.
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